1、标题：合作与技术创新：实证研究综述

作者：张苏 高伟

【摘要】经济学研究技术创新的主要关注点在于“竞争”，但是“合作”有可能是“竞争”的理性替代。无论从单个技术创新主体的成本－收益维度，还是从人类进步和社会总福利的维度看，人们都应该高度关注：如何合作进行技术创新，或在技术创新过程中如何合作？各国的技术创新合作有助于分摊成本、共享知识、扩大产业有效R&D投资、帮助产业找到最优技术路线，从而创造合作剩余。

【关键词】合作，技术创新，成本－收益分析，合作剩余

中图分类号: F061.2 文献标识码：A

2、标题：合作的产生：一个多视角理论综述

作者：龚向虎

【摘要】经济学假定行为主体是自利主义者，经济主体之间的关系建立在各自利益驱动的基础上，由此拓展而形成错综复杂的社会关系。囚徒困境、公地悲剧等经典理论论述了“不合作”的存在基础。为解释社会上存在的合作行为，诸多学科和领域给出了不同的解释。本文通过对博弈论、信任理论、演化理论、生物学、社会学等多学科的相关理论的分析，对关于“合作产生”的理论进行综合，并进行一定程度的总结，期望对现有的关于合作产生的解释提供更为坚实、全面的分析，并指出进一步研究的可能方向。

【关键词】合作 理性 学习理论 演化

中图分类号：F069.9 文献标识码：A

3、标题：市场不完备性、机制设计和封闭式基金折价之谜――一个全新的理论与实证框架

作者：李庆峰

【摘 要】基于期权分解定价模型，本文论证了完备市场上基金按净值定价的理论基础，进而通过宏微观两个层面的对比，揭示了封闭式基金折价的机理在于现实金融市场的不完备性以及微观机制设计的不足。模型中动态修正因子的进一步引入，可以合理地解释封闭式基金折价问题的诸多谜团。基于我国的一个面板数据样本，实证分析结果较好地验证了本文分析框架的合理性。文章最后提出了降低折价率的宏微观对策建议，初步探讨了本文分析框架和现有理论假说之间的关系，同时指出当前投资封闭式基金的机会所在。

【关键词】折价 期权 市场不完备 机制设计

中图分类号：F830.91 文献标识码：A

4、标题：基于西方经济史与超边际经济学解释专业中间商的出现

作者：庞春

【摘要】为什么中间商存在？本文提出这一问题，依托西方经济史文献，解释中间商的功能及经济性质，指出这些文献在解释中间商的出现与经济变迁上存在的不足，进而说明需要一种解释经济组织变迁的方法― 超边际分析方法。本文厘清了中间商在经济中存在的理由：专业中间商是交易效率充分改进(或单位交易费用不断降低)所导致的分工演进的产物，他们的出现是经济发展的一个标志。本文对于理解经济组织，尤其是商业组织的结构变迁具有重要意义。

【关键词】专业中间商、分工、交易效率、经济进步、超边际分析

中图分类号：F014.2, F119, F019 文献标识码：A

5、标题：秩序的经济分析

作者：刘业进

【摘要】不仅仅是“分工”、“组织”和“制度”，而是“经济秩序”需要置于整个经济学分析的中心。经济秩序理论旨在回答一个可靠的日常经济生活得以可能这一看似平常的奇迹，即经济系统的秩序何以形成。斯密隐喻、门格尔非意图后果理论和哈耶克自发秩序理论构成经济秩序理论的主线。新近的交易费用理论和演化经济学在以下几个方面推进了经济秩序理论研究：分工的协调及其产本（协调产本）与迂回生产中的学习成本；经济系统中的结构和通讯；经济中的创新、选择和模仿等演化细节；穿越经济层级的涌现性等。

【关键词】经济秩序、非意图后果、交易成本、复杂性、涌现

中图分类号：F06 文献标识码：A

6、标题：政绩考核与增长之痛――中国式分权的过去与未来

作者：张威吴能全

【摘要】基于中国式分权结构的政府竞争是中国经济高速增长的重要原因，也是当前中国经济和社会发展面临的一系列重大挑战的根源。通过中央政府与地方政府之间的一个委托代理模型，我们分析了在中国式的分权结构下，基于“增长”绩效的政绩考核在特定历史阶段的合理性，并讨论了它在中国改革时序中的两种不同效果。给定地方政府负有“增长”与“发展”的双重任务，中国改革的初始状态――“增长”与“发展”双重不足――决定了“增长”与“发展”在中国改革的前半段是可以互相补充的。在“增长”与“发展”互相补充的绩效模式下，均衡的激励合约仅仅取决于两种绩效在考核成本上的对比，这就是为什么GDP在事实上成为了地方政府竞争的标尺。但是，随着改革一次性潜力的释放，“增长”与“发展”的绩效组合逐渐逼近资源约束下的绩效可能性边界，二者开始呈现出互相替代的绩效模式。在新的绩效模式下，“增长”绩效的提升以牺牲“发展”绩效为代价，“增长”与“发展”出现分野。因此，中国改革过程中前后相继的两种不同绩效模式解释了为什么“为增长而竞争”（Competition for Growth）在中国改革的前半段是“趋好的”Race to the Top），而在后半段却是“趋坏的”(Race to the Bottom)。

【关键词】地方政府、增长、政绩考核

中文分类号：F120.3 文献标识码：A

7.标题：纵向财政竞争、讨价还价与中央―地方的土地收入分成――对20世纪80年代以来土地收入的考察

作者：张清勇

【摘 要】本文回顾了20世纪80年代以来中央与地方之间土地收入分成的历史，利用1994年分税制财政体制改革的自然实验，通过比较城镇土地使用税、耕地占用税和国有土地有偿出让收入在分税制改革前后的差异，验证了中央和地方之间在土地收入上的纵向竞争关系；通过对1998年《土地管理法》修订前后中央和地方之间激烈讨价还价过程的刻画，为以讨价还价为主要特征之一的中国纵向财政竞争提供了一个具体的案例。

【关键词】纵向财政竞争 讨价还价 土地收入

中图分类号：F810.43 文献标识码：A

8、标题：企业集群的存在性及其演化――基于集聚因子模型的框架

作者：王凤荣 高明华

【摘 要】企业的集中或积聚，生成了集群内部市场。集聚因子是对集群内部市场有效性的制度度量。基于集聚因子的集群产出模型证明了企业集群的存在性，而集聚因子的不同及变化动态凸现着企业集群的生命周期阶段的演变和类型差异，因此集聚因子模型对于优化集群治理进而提高政府产业政策效率具有现实意义。

【关键词】企业集群 集聚因子 集群内部市场 生命周期

中图分类号：F207 文献标识码：A

9、标题：当代中国农村宗族制度演化的一般逻辑

作者：蔡立雄 何炼成

【摘 要】中国农村宗族制度的主要功能是生存保障功能和发展功能，宗族制度的兴衰与其功能的承担和发挥密切相关。建国初宗族制度的衰退是土改使宗族制度生存保障的必要性和能力大为下降的结果。1953年后集体化和人民公社化运动使农民丧失了生产积极性和灾年的自我保障能力，农民回归向宗族寻求生存保障，使宗族制度获得增强。1978年后发展成为农民参与经济活动的主要目的，宗族制度中以维持生存为目标的功能性制度失去了存在的必要性，但由于正式制度的不完善性，农民大量发掘宗族制度中有利发展的因素，宗族制度在短暂衰退后再度复兴。1990年代后期，中国宏观经济形势的变化和社会信用体系的发展以及新经济组织对宗族制度的有效替代，中国乡村基本摆脱了对宗族制度的依赖。

【关键词】农村 宗族制度 功能 演化

中图分类号：F063.1 文献标识码：A

10、标题：综合运用财产规则和责任规则保护被拆迁人利益

作者：魏建 宋微

【摘 要】商业拆迁中如何保护被拆迁人的合法权益是一个社会焦点问题。财产规则和责任规则是法经济学提出的保护产权的两个基本规则，本文在低交易成本和高交易成本两种情况下分别讨论了被拆迁人利益保护问题。在高交易成本情况下运用了博弈模型展开分析，提出了一个融合财产规则和责任规则优势的制度安排来保护被拆迁人的合法权益

【关键词】房屋拆迁 财产规则 责任规则

中图分类号：F063.1 文献标识码：A

11、标题：交易成本、风险合约与民间借贷

作者：刘瑞明 白永秀

【摘 要】本文利用交易成本理论与合约理论，将民间借贷理解为一个既定约束条件下的自由合约。本文的研究表明，既定交易环境下必然存在的外生交易成本与风险合约导致的内生交易成本共同引致了民间借贷的产生及其形态，随着外生交易成本与内生交易成本的变动，民间借贷表现出不同的形态。在既定约束条件下，民间借贷是一个长期均衡，其负面影响只有在对外生交易成本和内生交易成本加以限制后才能得到根本改善。

【关键词】交易成本 风险合约 民间借贷

中图分类号：F830.5 文献标识码：A

12、标题：合作与不合作：农村社区公共品供给中的多重均衡

作者：时磊 杨德才

【摘 要】本文在农户能力异质性的背景下，通过引入社会荣辱感，研究发展中国家的农村社区公共品的不合作问题。研究发现：（1）社区凝聚力缺失导致的人们对于社会荣辱感的在意程度下降，是导致社区公共品合作参数序列狭小的重要原因（2）合作有利于减小异质性，培育社区凝聚力，从而有利于合作，这是一个正反馈；不合作的负反馈也存在。社会调查的实证资料证实了我们的理论推测。对于当前中国面临的如何在商业化与人口流动背景下培育、重建社区凝聚力问题，文章结合日本的经验，认为需要政府发挥作用来培育农民相互协助的社会合作。

【关键词】异质性 多重均衡 社会荣辱感

中图分类号：F306.4 文献标识码：A

13、标题：中国高速公路政府管制制度变迁研究

作者：王军 韩光华

【摘 要】研究中国高速公路政府管制制度变迁具有重要的理论和实践价值。西方经济学关于制度变迁的理论主要包括以诺斯为代表的新制度学派的制度变迁理论、演进观的制度变迁理论和进化博弈观的制度变迁理论。本文充分利用以上理论内容，对中国高速公路政府管制制度变迁进行研究，同时形成了关于制度变迁的微观结构理论，以求深入探究制度变迁的具体过程，丰富制度变迁理论的内容。

【关键词】高速公路政府管制；制度变迁；微观结构

中图分类号：F294 文献标识码：A

14．标题：内生货币与粘滞价格的周期模型中规则货币政策福利问题研究

作者：陈昆亭 周炎 龚六堂

【摘 要】本文建立了内生货币供给、粘滞定价的周期动态模型。通过数值试验模拟实际经济来讨论规则货币政策稳定经济的能力和福利损失问题。本文指出：（1）在本文模型假设条件下，模型经济的周期波动具有内生性；（2）在政策参数适当的条件下，规则货币政策可以用做稳定经济的工具；（3）在本文的均衡模型中，消费过程随风险回避系数的不同而不同；在规则政策基础上，货币政策的实际波动成本非常小，但政策扰动的边际福利成本显著。

【关键词】内生货币，泰勒规则，周期波动

中图分类号：F831.0 文献标识码：A

1.Title:Cooperation andTechnologicalInnovation: A Review of Empirical Study

Author(s):Zhang Su Gao Wei

Abstract: The focus of the study oftechnologicalinnovation in economics is "competition", but "cooperation" may be the rational alternative. Whether from the dimension of cost-benefit analysis of a single technological innovator, or from the dimension of promotion of human progress and social welfare, people should be highly concerned about: how to cooperate to further technological innovation or how to cooperate in the process of technological innovation. The technological innovation cooperation among nations may help split cost, share knowledge, expand effective industrial R & D investment and help find the optimaltechnologicalroute, thus to create cooperative residual.

Key words:cooperation;technologicalinnovation; cost-benefit analysis; cooperative residual

JEL Classifications:O300

2. Title:The Causes of Cooperation：An Overview in Multi-angle

Author(s):Gong Xianghu

Abstract:Since the economic theories take humans as individualistic and self-benefit, the relationships between agents are based on self-interest, those relationships spread out and engender complex community relationships. Prisoners’ dilemmas, the tragedy of the Commons and many other theories have discussed the base of non-cooperation. To explain the cooperation widely exist in the society, a good many subjects presents their different explanations. This paper reviews the relative attitudes of game theory, credibility theory, evolutionary theory, biology, political science and so on, and summarizes them. We hope to present a general analysis and point out the possible aspect of research.

Keywords:cooperation rationality evolutionary theory learning theory

JEL Classifications：D740 D830 P130

3. Title:Incomplete Market, Mechanism Design and Discounts Puzzle on Close-end Funds: One New Theoretical and Empirical Frame

Author(s):Li Qingfeng

Abstract：Based on option decomposition pricing model, this paper proves that close-end funds should always be priced with its net value on condition of complete market. Combined with comparison in macro-levels and micro-level, the paper discloses incomplete market and the scarcity of micro-mechanism designing are the root cause of discounts. Furthermore, through introducing the dynamic correction factor, most puzzles on close-end funds’ discounts are reasonably answered. And based on one panel data in Chinese market, the result of empirical study certificates the reasonability of the new theoretical frame Finally, some measures are put forward to reduce the discounts level.

Key Words：discounts;option decomposition model; incomplete market; mechanism design

JEL Classifications：G120 C510 P520

4. Title:The Emergence of Specialized Middlemen: From the Perspective of Western Economic History and Infra-marginal Economics

Author(s): Pang Chun

Abstract：This paper starts from the inquiry that I made: why does the specialized middleman emerge and exist in the economy? In terms of their economic nature, I examine the western economic historical literature and indicate that the puzzle still perplexes us. I argue that the infra-marginal approach is appropriate in elucidating the justification of the emergence and existence of middlemen and thereby present a proposition that the specialized middleman is a product of the evolving division of labor propelled by the sufficiently improved transaction efficiency (or by the continuingly falling transaction costs). This paper is significant for understanding the structural change particularly in the commerce.

Key Words:Specialized Middlemen, Division of Labor, Transaction Efficiency, Economic Progress, Infra-marginal Analysis

JEL Classifications:N800; O120; B400

5.Title:Economic analysis to economic order

Author(s): Liu Yejin

Abstract:Not only the “division of labor”, “organization” and “institutions”, but also “economic order” should be played at the centre of Economics. Economic Order Theory seeks to answer a miracle that seem to be common how a reliable day-to-day economic life is possible, in an other words, how does the order of economic system form. Smith's metaphor, Carl Menger's theory of unintentional consequences and Hayek's theory of spontaneous order constitute the mainstream of Economic Order Theory. Recently, Transaction Cost Theory and Evolution Economics promote the studies of Economic Order Theory in following areas, such as The coordination to division of labor and its costs (coordination costs), roundabout production and the learning costs in it; hierarchical structure and communication in economic system; evolutional details such as innovation, selection and imitation in economic system; the emergent property in economic system and so on.

Keywords: economic order; unintentional consequences; transaction costs; complexity; emergent property

JEL Classifications: D210 L290 P410

6.Title:Performance Metering and Growth Dilemma:The Past and Forecast of China’s Decentralization

Author(s):Wei Zhang Nengquan Wu

ABSTRACT：The structure based on decentralization is responsible for both China’s rapid economic growth in the past and the recent challenges suffering china. By employing a multi-task principle-agent model, we try to justify the growth-oriented metering system in certain historic period and discuss its two different outcomes in the time sequence ofChina’s reform. Given the local government is responsible for growth and development,China’s initial status characterized by the dual lack of growth and development determines the two performances can be mutually facilitated by each other in the first stage ofChina’s reform. If the two performance indicators can be simultaneously improved, the incentive contract between the central government and local ones only relies on the metering cost, this is why we found the GDP ranking actually served as a yardstick for the competition among local authorities. But as the one-off potential of reform was released, performance combination approaches the performance possibility frontier determined by the given resources constraints, the growth and development start to diverge. So the two different performance pattern in the time sequence of china’s reform explained why “competition for growth” is a race to the top in the first stage of china’s reform but a race to the bottom in the latter period.

Keywords：Local Government、Economic Growth、Performance Metering

JEL Classifications：P270 R590 H770

7. Title:Vertical Fiscal Competition, Bargaining, and the Land Revenue Sharing Relationship between Central and Local Governments inChina

Author(s):Qingyong Zhang

Abstract:From a vertical fiscal competition perspective, this paper reviews the history of land revenue sharing system between Chinese central and local governments since the 1980s. Using the natural experiment created by the 1994 fiscal reform, we verified the competitive government hypothesis by comparing fiscal performances of local governments upon different types of land revenues before and after the reform. The fierce bargaining process between the central and local governments concerning rearrangement of land revenue sharing mechanism around the 1998 Land Management Law Amendment is described and analyzed in detail, providing a case for the Chinese vertical fiscal competition, of which bargaining is one of its defining features.

Key words:Vertical Fiscal Competition Bargaining Land Revenue

JEL Classifications:H27 H39 H71

8. Title:The Existence and Evolution of Business Clusters--Based on a Outline of Convergency Factor Model

Author(s):Wang Fengrong Gao Minghua

Abstract：Concentration and centralization of Business create the inner market of Business clusters. Convergency factor is an institution measure to the inner market efficiency. The cluster product model based on Convergency Factor proves the existence of business clusters. The difference of Convergency Factor means cluster style diversity, and the change of convergency factor embodies the dynamic evolution of cluster life cycle. So convergency factor model is helpful to improve the cluster governance then make great progress in local government industrial policy efficiency.

Key words: Business Clusters Convergency Factor inner market of Business clusters cluster life cycle

JEL Classifications:R000

9. Title:The General Logic of Rural clan system Evolution in Contemporary China

Author(s):Cai Lixiong He Liancheng

Abstract:The main function of the Chinese rural clan system issurvivalguarantee function and development function, the rise and fall of clan system is closely relate to its function’sassumption and exertion.Land reform inthe early days of 1950s decrease the necessity and ability ofsurvivalguarantee function greatly for clan system, clan systemdescendat that time. Collectivization andthe People's Commune campaign from1953 ,peasants losethe productive enthusiasmand theability of self-security at disaster year, and have to resert to clan forsurvivalguarantee,this make the clan system increase.From 1978 ,development becomepeasants’main purpose, the survivalguarantee function lose existent necessity in the clan system, but because of not perfect in formal institution,peasantsexplore a great deal of beneficial factors for development in clan system, the clan system renforce once more after brief decline.Sincelate of1990s,because of the variety of the macroeconomic situation , the development ofsocial credibility systemand new economic organizations ,the functions of the clan system is insteaded available, Chinese rural areal get away dependence from the clan systemgenerally.

Keywords:Rural Areal; Clan System; Function; Evolution

JEL Classifications: R000

10. Title:Protecting The Interests of People Whose House is Demolished by Property Rules and Liability Rules

Author(s):Song Wei Wei Jian

Abstract:How to protect the interests of people whose house is demolished is a focus issue. Property rules and liability rules are two basic rules of property right protection in law and economics view. We discuss this focus issue under low transaction costs and high transaction costs. Under high transaction cost, we put forward an institutional arrangement that integrates the property rules and liability rules to protect the interests of people whose house is demolished.

Key words:House demolition, Property rules, Liability rules

JEL Classifications: K110 K400

11. Title:Transaction Costs, Risk Contract and the Inter-personal Credit

Author(s): Liu Ruiming Bai Yongxiu

Abstract:With the help of theory of transaction cost and theory of contract, we consider the inter-personal credit as a free contract under a series of vested restrain conditions. The exogenous transaction cost which must exist in the transaction environment and the endogenous transaction cost which caused by the risk contract give rise to the creation and form of the inter-personal credit. Along with the change of the exogenous transaction cost and the endogenous transaction cost, the inter-personal credit put up different form. As a long-term equilibrium, the bad effects of the inter-personal credit will be improved only after the transaction costs are restrained.

Key Words:Transaction costs Risk Contract Inter-personal credit

JEL Classification:D230 L140 G140

12.Title:Cooperation and Non-cooperation:MultipleEquilibria in the Supply of Rural Community Public Goods

Author(s): Shi Lei Yang Decai

Abstract:This paper discusses the reason why there are cooperation and non-cooperation in the supply of rural community public goods, based on the foundation ofheterogeneity and in the perspective of having or no social capital. We argues the non-cooperation in thetoday China＇s supply of rural community public goods is due to, commerce and market development destroy the social capital and intensify theheterogeneityin the community, and that minish the parameter series which the cooperative equilibrium is feasible on. But the foster of newly social capital doesn’t be enforced successfully. At the same time, theheterogeneitydeduced by non-cooperation of farmers can be intensified in the commerce and market development. Thisheterogeneity makes the cooperation more difficult.It is the same that thecooperative equilibrium is also a self-enforcement one. Then, we argue we must foster social cooperation and economic cooperation for the farmers inChina.

Key Words:Heterogeneity;MultipleEquilibria; Cooperative Equilibrium;Social Capital

JEL Classifications: Q120 R330

13. Title:Study on the Institutional Evolution of Governmental Regulation of Expressway inChina

Author(s):Wang Jun Han Guanghua

Abstract:It is of great significance in both theory and practice to study the institutional evolution of governmental regulation of expressway in china. Theories about institutional evolutionin Western Economics mainly include those of Neo-institutional Economic represented by North, of Evolution Concept and of Evolutionary Game Theory. In this article, the author, taking full advangage of the above theories, studies the evolvement of governmental regulation institution of expressway inChinaand establishes some micro-structure theory about institutional evolvement so as to explore its specific process and enrich its content.

Key words: governmental regulation of expressway; institutional evolvement; micro-structure

JEL Classifications: H410 H540 P250

14. Title:Welfare Analysis of Rule-kind Monetary Policy in Endogenous-money and Sticky-prices Business Cycle Model

Author(s): Chen Kunting Zhou Yan Gong Liutang

Abstract:This paper establishes a business cycle model with endogenous money and sticky prices. The model has a stable solution for global parameter’s value. We model the real economy with reasonable parameters, which are tried out by experiments. Through the modeling economy, we study the stability and welfare of rule-kind monetary policy. We find that, under suitable value of policy parameters, rule-kind monetary policy works well as a tool to stabilize the economy; Unlike that as traditional Lucas method gives, in our equilibrium model, consumption process varies with the coefficient of the risk aversion, so we get the lower the cost of business cycle than that in Lucas model. And we also conclude that margin cost of policy shock can’t be neglected.

Key words: endogenous money,Taylorrule, business cycle

JEL Classifications:E37, E52, E40