题目：Deal or No Deal? The Effect of Alcohol Drinking on Bargaining

演讲人：张吉鹏 西南财经大学 经济与管理研究院副教授

时间：2016年3月29日 星期二 15:00

地点：邵逸夫科学馆513

主持人：李菁萍 js9159路线检测

演讲人简介：

张吉鹏副教授在复旦大学获得经济学学士与硕士学位，在匹兹堡大学获得经济学博士学位。他的研究领域涉及政府职能与城镇化、经济地理学、公司慈善、经济学实验等领域，研究成果已在International Economic Review、Economic Inquiry、Southern Economic Journal、中国社会科学、经济学（季刊）、经济研究等国内外顶尖经济学期刊上发表。

演讲论文简介：

在亚洲国家中，饮酒是商务谈判中不可或缺的一部分。饮酒是否会影响谈判者策略和最终的谈判结果呢？如果是，其中存在怎样的作用机制？本文运用实验经济学的方法，研究了适度饮酒对谈判行为的影响。研究发现，适度饮酒提高了被试的合作意愿，并且提高了谈判双方的收益。由于饮酒没有改变被试的利他偏好与风险偏好，一个可能的解释是Eyster & Rabin (2005)提出的“魔咒均衡”（the cursed equilibrium)，即被试在酒精作用下无法正确评估对方的决策与博弈结果的关系。这个解释被实验数据的结构性模型回归结果所支持。

文章摘要：

Alcohol drinking during business negotiation is a very common practice, particularly in some East Asian countries. Does alcohol consumption affect negotiator’s strategy and consequently the outcome of the negotiation? If so, what is the mechanism through which alcohol impacts negotiator’s behavior? We investigate the effect of a moderate amount of alcohol on negotiation using controlled experiments. Subjects are randomly matched into pairs to play a bargaining game with adverse selection. In the game, each subject is given a private endowment. The total endowment is scaled up and shared equally between the pair provided that they agree to collaborate. It is found that a moderate amount of alcohol consumption increases subjects’ willingness to collaborate, thus improving their average payoff. We find that alcohol consumption increases neither subjects’ preference for risk nor altruism. A possible explanation for the increase in the likelihood of collaboration is that subjects under the influence of alcohol are more ”cursed” in the sense of Eyster and Rabin (2005), which is supported by the estimation results of a structural model of quantile response equilibrium.