腾讯会议，会议号： 542-678-177

主讲人：张博宇

题目：Cooperation and coordination in heterogeneous population

摘要：One landmark application of evolutionary game theory is the study of social dilemmas. This literature explores why people cooperate even when there are strong incentives to defect. Much of this literature, however, assumes that interactions are symmetric. Individuals are assumed to have the same strategic options and the same potential pay-offs. Yet many interesting questions arise once individuals are allowed to differ. Here, we study asymmetry in simple coordination games. In our set-up, human participants need to decide how much of their endowment to contribute to a public good. If a group’s collective contribution reaches a pre-defined threshold, all group members receive a reward. To account for possible asymmetries, individuals either differ in their endowments or their productivities. According to a theoretical equilibrium analysis, such games tend to have many possible solutions. In equilibrium, group members may contribute the same amount, different amounts or nothing at all. According to our behavioural experiment, however, humans favour the equilibrium in which everyone contributes the same proportion of their endowment. We use these experimental results to highlight the non-trivial effects of inequality on cooperation, and we discuss to which extent models of evolutionary game theory can account for these effects.

主讲人介绍：张博宇，北京师范大学数学科学学院，教授、博士生导师，行为与博弈决策实验室主任。2006年和2009年于北京师范大学获学士和硕士学位，2012年于奥地利维也纳大学获博士学位。2012年加入北京师范大学。主要研究方向包括演化博弈和学习模型、激励机制设计、网络博弈、行为实验和行为大数据等。在PNAS，One Earth，Operations Research，Games and Economic Behavior等发表论文50余篇。主持国家自然科学基金重点项目和优秀青年基金等项目。担任Dynamic Games and Applications副主编和多个国际期刊编委