时间：2022年10月10日14：30

地点：腾讯会议，会议号：581-153-219

主讲人：龚冰琳

题目：Can Adjusted Reputation Score Improve Market Efficiency? -Theory and Experiment

主讲人介绍：龚冰琳，华东师范大学经济管理学部研究员、紫江青年学者、博导。美国马里兰大学经济系博士。曾任复旦大学、上海交通大学教师。研究领域包括实验经济学、行为经济学、应用微观经济学等。通过理论建模、实验和实证方法研究社会环境、信息和规则对决策的影响。论文发表在经管类国际顶级期刊Management Science和经济学国际著名期刊Games and Economic Behavior、Experimental Economics、Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization、Journal of Economic Psychology等上。获得第八届全国高校人文社科论文奖二等奖和上海市第十四届哲学社会科学优秀成果奖学科学术奖论文一等奖。2021年被评为上海市领军人才。主持多项国家级、省部级和国际合作科研项目。担任中国行为与实验经济学论坛学术委员、中国运筹学会博弈论分会理事和The Economic Journal等多本著名国际学术期刊审稿人。

摘要：Reputation system is an important mechanism to solve adverse selection and moral hazard problems. However, in reality reviewers are heterogeneous and the scores they give might be misleading for people with different standards, especially when sample sizes are small or when reviewers are self-selected. In this study we first design two adjusted average reputation scores based on first-order information and second-order information and build economic models to show their effects on market efficiency. Then we test their effects over simple average reputation scores and a baseline treatment without reputation system in a lemon market experiment.