时间：2022年5月5日 14:30

地点：腾讯会议线上

主讲人一：陈言

题目：企业金融化与要素收入分配

主讲人二：陈茁

题目：Mediation in Ultimatum Bargaining with Reciprocity: A Bayesian Persuasion Approach

摘要: We examine optimal information disclosure by an informed mediator through Bayesian persuasion in a bilateral ultimatum bargaining game with two-sided incomplete information and prosocial preferece. The information changes how the responder attributes the bidder's aggressive offer, and hence her reaction to it. When the mediator maximizes the settlement probability, the optimal signal is a partial revelation where the buyer has a chance to confirm that the cost is low, but cannot confirm the cost is high. When the mediator maximizes the expected revenue of the bidder, the optimal signal persuades the seller to bid aggressively if the buyer is expected to be good-tempered.